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HE scope of a tax reform proposal is often determinative of its
success. An otherwise rational proposal to reform the taxation of
certain transactions, for example, may be less sensible once con-
sideration is given to broader patterns and inconsistencies in the tax law.
Nowhere is this more true than in the corporate tax area and subchapter
C of the Code.
One of the major discontinuities in subchapter C is the disparate tax
treatment of stock and asset acquisitions. Since the repeal of General
Utilities,' an acquisition of all of the assets of a target corporation may
result in two immediate taxes if the target liquidates as part of the trans-
action. In contrast, an acquisition of all of the stock of the target gener-
ally results in only a single immediate tax even if the parties achieve the
economic equivalent of the asset acquisition by subsequently liquidating
the target into the acquiring corporation.2
This discontinuity challenges the coherence of much of subchapter C.
Consider, for example, its impact in the corporate reorganization area. In
order for a corporate asset acquisition to be tax-free at the corporate
level, it must qualify as a "reorganization" and satisfy "continuity of in-
terest."'3 In general, this means that some significant amount of the con-
sideration provided by the acquiring corporation must consist of stock of
that corporation.4 Yet a stock acquisition achieves "reorganization" con-
sequences at the corporate level even if there is zero continuity of interest
and the consideration consists entirely of cash.5
Into this confusion, Michael Schler boldly offers a series of proposals to
reform the taxation of divisive reorganizations. 6 He does not try first to
level the landscape by reconciling (or assuming away) the stock/asset dis-
continuity of subchapter C. Rather, he places his ideas within the skewed
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1. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
2. See George K. Yin, A Carryover Basis Asset Acquisition Regime?: A Few Words of
Caution, 37 TAX NOTES 415, 417 (1987); Eric M. Zolt, The General Utilities Doctrine:
Examining the Scope of Repeal, 65 TAXES 819, 822-23 (1987).
3. See I.R.C. §§ 361(a), 368(a), (b) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (2001).
4. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i).
5. Cf. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER C 72 (1982).
6. Michael L. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spinoff Rules, 56 SMU L.
REV. 239 (2003).
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framework of current law.7
Mr. Schler's task is worthwhile (though daunting). Despite prodding
by reformers over the last 16 years, Congress has not made any attempt
to enact broad scale reform of subchapter C, and there is no prospect of
its doing so anytime soon.8 In the meantime, for reasons well described
by Mr. Schler, § 355 virtually cries out for reform. It is appropriate,
therefore, to consider how to revise the divisive reorganization rules de-
spite the uneven terrain on which those rules must be situated.
Mr. Schler's paper contributes many excellent suggestions to "elimi-
nate unnecessary complexities and make the [divisive reorganization]
rules more consistent with their purpose." 9 In this commentary, I review
his proposals within the general context of current law-the ground rules
laid out by him-and describe how a clarification of the purpose of § 355
may lead to even greater simplification and coherence of the rule struc-
ture. Ultimately, however, true reform of § 355 may have to await resolu-
tion of the more fundamental problems of subchapter C.
Part I of this paper discusses the purpose of § 355 and part II sets forth
the conditions necessary to implement that purpose. Part III contains my
conclusion.
I. THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 355
Mr. Schler initially describes the purpose of § 355 as "allow[ing] a sin-
gle preexisting corporation or corporate group to be divided into parts
among its shareholders."' 10 He subsequently elaborates and identifies
three objectives for the provision: (1) make divisive transactions gener-
ally subject to the same requirements as those applicable to acquisitive
reorganizations because of the close analogy between the two types of
transactions; (2) prevent conversion of shareholder dividend income into
7. On two prior occasions, I have commented briefly on how § 355 might be made
more rational. In one, I assumed that the tax consequence of a stock acquisition was the
paradigm case. See George K. Yin, Taxing Corporate Liquidations (and Related Matters)
After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 TAX L. REV. 575, 661-64 (1987) [hereinafter Taxing
Corporate Liquidations]. In the other, I basically assumed the opposite, with the tax conse-
quence of an asset acquisition being the model result. See George K. Yin, Morris Trust,
Sec. 355(e), and the Future Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions, 80 TAX NOTES 375 (1998).
In his paper, Mr. Schler clearly rejects the stock acquisition model, see Schler, supra note 6,
at 266, but shows no sign of accepting the asset acquisition model either. Indeed, in prior
writing, he has clearly rejected the asset acquisition paradigm. See Michael Schler, Yes to
Section 355(e), No to Mandatory Section 338, Letter to the Editor, 80 TAX NOTES 733, 735(1998). Thus, he accepts the inconsistency of current law and attempts to devise a role for§ 355 within it. Current law, of course, is skewed in other respects. Certain businesses, for
example, escape having to pay an entity-level tax altogether, and the U.S. tax treatment of
an issue may be different from that of other countries. These considerations, which are
beyond the scope of this paper, merely illustrate the enormity of the reformer's task.
8. Changes to subchapter C made by Congress and the Treasury Department during
this period arguably point in different directions and none of them could even remotely be
considered broad scale reform. Cf Michael L. Schultz, The Evolution of the Continuity of
Interest Test, General Utilities Repeal and the Taxation of Corporate Acquisitions, 80 TAXES
229 (2002).




capital gain; and (3) prevent improper avoidance of corporate-level tax
when assets leave the corporate group." Unfortunately, this elaboration
of the goals of the provision leads him astray, and makes certain of his
proposals vulnerable to some of the same difficulties found in current
law.
The first objective suggests a linkage between corporate and share-
holder tax consequences. A qualifying acquisitive reorganization is tax-
free at both the corporate and shareholder levels if, among other things,
the transaction has a business purpose and satisfies continuity of interest
and continuity of business enterprise. Thus, if a corporate division is tax-
free because it is analogous to an acquisitive reorganization, the transac-
tion should presumably be tax-free to both the shareholders and the dis-
tributing corporation under certain conditions.
In contrast, the second objective is exclusively focused on the share-
holder consequences of the transaction, and is therefore not easily recon-
ciled with the first objective. A good illustration of the problem involves
the "device" clause, which is the quintessential provision intended to
carry out the second objective. But why should qualification of a divisive
transaction as a reorganization depend upon whether the transaction is
"used principally as a device for the distribution of ... earnings and prof-
its"? 12 Under current law, even as revised by Mr. Schler, that require-
ment leads to the nonsensical conclusion that the consequences to the
distributing corporation are affected by, for example, the structure of the
corporate division as a spinoff, splitoff, or splitup. a3
It is also unclear whether the third objective can be reconciled with the
first one, and current law reflects that uncertainty. On the one hand,
§ 355(d) and (e), provisions which most clearly try to achieve the third
objective under current law, are expressly "delinked" from the rest of
§ 355. Thus, they evidence a Congressional judgment that corporate-
level tax issues should not affect the tax consequences to the shareholders
of the transaction or its qualification as a reorganization. On the other
hand, exactly the opposite judgment is reflected by the 1987 amendment
to § 355(b)(2)(D), which was added as an early and crude version of
§ 355(d) and similarly intended to achieve the third objective. 14 Failure
to satisfy the amended requirement causes the entire transaction to lose
its reorganization status, with resulting taxation at both corporate and
shareholder levels. It seems inconceivable that both of these outcomes
are correct.
11. Id. at 248-49.
12. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(B) (2002).
13. See I.R.C. § 355(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(ii), -2(d)(5)(iv) (1992); cf. Jef-
frey T. Sheffield & Herwig J. Schlunk, Reconciling Spin-Offs with General Utilities Repeal,
74 TAXES 941, 943 (1996).
14. Cf BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11-35 n.137 (7th ed. 2000); Richard L. Reinhold, Section
355(e): How We Got Here and Where We Are, 82 TAX NOTES 1485, 1487 (1999).
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Finally, the third objective, on its own, is difficult to accomplish in the
context of a typical divisive transaction. Assume that P corporation owns
all of the stock of S corporation and in a spinoff, P distributes all of the S
stock to the shareholders of P. In general, if there is a 50-percent-or-
greater change of ownership of either P or S in connection with the spi-
noff, then either § 355(d) or (e) causes the distribution to be taxable to
the distributing corporation. As Mr. Schler notes, this result is consistent
with the third objective if the change of ownership relates to S but not if it
relates to p.15 In the latter case, a disposition out of the corporate group
of the P assets triggers a tax measured by the amount of P's gain inherent
in its stock in S. The problem is that the form of a corporate division does
not match the tax objective identified for it.
In short, although Congress has articulated at various times all three of
the objectives identified by Mr. Schler, it does not seem possible to draft
a coherent statute that achieves all three. Like current law, Mr. Schler
asks § 355 to do too much and, as a result, the provision ends up not
accomplishing any of its objectives very well. A slight clarification of the
purpose of § 355 is needed if we are to have a sensible set of rules in this
area.
According to its legislative history, the original provision permitting
tax-free treatment of a corporate division was enacted because the trans-
action was considered a form of corporate reorganization. 16 As described
in the regulations, the purpose of the acquisitive reorganization provi-
sions is to "except from the general rule certain specifically described
[transactions] incident to such readjustments of corporate structures...
as are required by business exigencies and which effect only a readjust-
ment of continuing interest in property under modified corporate
forms."17
A classic case illustrating the need for § 355 is Rockefeller v. United
States.18 In that case, the taxpayer's corporations were engaged in both
the production and interstate transportation of oil. An adverse court de-
cision permitted government regulation of the transportation end of the
business. Consequently, to prevent government interference with the
production activities, the taxpayer separated the two components of his
corporations by transferring the transportation assets to newly formed
subsidiaries and then spinning off the stock of the new subsidiaries pro
15. See Schler, supra note 6, at 268.
16. See H.R. REp. No. 179, at 16 (1924), reprinted in J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGIS-
LATIvE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws, 1938-1861, at 697 (1938) (divisive trans-
action is "common type of reorganization"); 65 CONG. REc. 2429 (1924) (statement of
Rep. Green, Chairman, House Ways & Means Comm.) (splitting of one corporation into
two or more corporations is one of "usual forms of corporate reorganization").
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986, at 337 (1987) (stating
that § 355 provides tax-free treatment of a transaction that "merely effects a readjustment
of the shareholder's continuing interest in the corporation in modified form"); Karla W.
Simon & Daniel L. Simmons, The Future of Section 355, 40 TAX NOTES 291, 293 (1988).
18. Rockefeller v. United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
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rata. There was clearly a non-tax business purpose for the separation. In
addition, the taxpayer continued to own the stock in all of the resulting
companies following the spinoff, with such stock merely representing the
same underlying business interests indirectly owned by him prior to the
transaction. Nevertheless, due to the absence of any statutory rule pro-
viding otherwise, the Supreme Court held that the receipt of the subsidi-
ary stock was a taxable dividend to the taxpayer. Congress subsequently
reversed this result by enacting the predecessor to § 355 to provide non-
recognition treatment for such transactions. 19 As in the case of an acquis-
itive reorganization, certain divisions of corporate structures driven by
business exigencies, such as that involved in Rockefeller, should be tax-
free to both the shareholders and the distributing corporation.
What type of divisive transaction should fall outside of § 355 protec-
tion? Initially, almost any such transaction would seem to be a good can-
didate for "reorganization" and tax-free status because both shareholder-
level and corporate operating-level gains and losses can be fully pre-
served after the transaction. Moreover, the gain lost in the transaction if
it is fully tax-free-the distributing corporation's gain in its stock in the
controlled corporation-is a "third" level of tax that is frequently excused
in subchapter C.2 0 From this perspective, it might seem that reorganiza-
tion status could be liberally granted to corporate divisions.
But in Rockefeller, Justice Pitney early recognized an important feature
of a tax-free divisive transaction. After noting that the taxpayer did not
dispose of any of the subsidiary stock following the distribution, the
Court said:
Nevertheless the new stock [distributed to the taxpayer] represented
assets of the [original] companies ... . that before had constituted
portions of their surplus assets, and it was capable of division among
stockholders as the [original] properties were not. The distribution,
whatever its effect upon the aggregate interests of the mass of stock-
holders, constituted in the case of each individual a gain in the form
of actual exchangeable assets transferred to him from the [original]
company for his separate use in partial realization of his former indi-
visible and contingent interest in the corporate surplus.2'
In other words, although the taxpayer immediately after the distribu-
tion merely owned the same underlying interests as he did prior to the
transaction, the division provided him with an opportunity that he did not
formerly have. After the division, the taxpayer was in a position to retain
his pre-existing share of certain of the underlying interests while reducing
his share of certain others, and to incur only a capital gains tax on the
disposition. In contrast, absent the division, the taxpayer would generally
have had to incur an ordinary income tax to achieve that same end. With-
19. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, § 203(h)(1)(B), 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
20. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 243(a), 332(a), 338(h)(10) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)
(2000).
21. Rockefeller, 257 U.S. at 183-84 (emphasis added).
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out a division, the taxpayer could have sold a portion of his stock in the
entire enterprise with only a capital gains tax, but that sale would not
have left him in the same economic position as his post-division situation.
Although not the focus of Justice Pitney's comment, a corporate divi-
sion also provides the taxpayer with an opportunity to realize a corporate-
level tax advantage generally not present before the transaction. Con-
sider a corporation with several businesses. Without a divisive transac-
tion as a preliminary step, the taxpayer could not easily dispose of certain
of the corporate businesses and retain certain others without having the
corporation incur a corporate-level tax. An asset disposition by the cor-
poration qualifying as a tax-free reorganization generally has to include
"substantially all" of the properties of the corporation.22 A disposition of
the stock of the corporation avoids a corporate-level tax, but that transac-
tion reduces or eliminates the shareholder's interest in all of the corpora-
tion's underlying business interests.2 3 By permitting a corporate
enterprise to be broken into smaller corporate structures, a tax-free divi-
sive transaction thus enables the disposition of only certain businesses
without corporate-level tax through either a stock or qualifying asset ac-
quisition of the structure housing that business. The division creates the
possibility of a disposition of selective corporate assets without corporate
tax.24
The recent case of South Tulsa Pathology Laboratory, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner25 provides an illustration of an attempt to achieve both of these
advantages. In that case, the taxpayer was a corporation that decided to
sell one of its two businesses to a buyer. Instead of a straight asset sale,
which was the way the buyer preferred to carry out transactions like this,
the taxpayer transferred the targeted business into a new subsidiary and
then spun off the stock of the subsidiary pro rata among the taxpayer's
shareholders. The shareholders then sold the buyer the stock of the for-
mer subsidiary holding the desired business. The court held that the spi-
22. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C), (2)(D). The "straight" tax-free merger provision-
§ 368(a)(1)(A)-does not contain a "substantially all" requirement, but without a pre-tai-
loring step, the merging corporation cannot pick and choose the assets to be acquired. See
Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436.
23. If the target corporation were organized with subsidiaries, it could dispose of cer-
tain subsidiaries and not others in a qualifying reorganization without incurring a corpo-
rate-level tax. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B), (2)(E). But distribution by the target of the
acquiring corporation stock received in the reorganization would then trigger that tax (as
well as a shareholder-level tax). See I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1), 311(b)(1).
24. Granted, a taxpayer could have obtained this same benefit if it had had the fore-
sight to incorporate the businesses in separate nonsubsidiary corporations from the outset.
See Paul B. Stephan III, Disaggregation and Subchapter C: Rethinking Corporate Tax Re-form, 76 VA. L. REV. 655, 684, 700 (1990). But that arrangement would have precluded the
taxpayer from netting operating income and losses of the businesses with one another. Cf.
I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a)(1)(A) (2002) (to be eligible to file a consolidated return, a group of
corporations must have a common parent corporation). Thus, the taxpayer typically wants
to have it both ways-to house the businesses within the same structure during their oper-
ating years and to house them within separate structures upon their disposition-with a
tax-free division at the opportune time being the key to realizing both benefits.
25. S. Tulsa Pathology Lab., Inc. v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 84 (2002).
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noff failed to qualify for tax-free treatment under § 355 because of the
device clause.2 6 The shareholders therefore were not permitted to con-
vert what would otherwise have been ordinary income into capital gain.
The court further observed that the transaction appeared to have been
designed to avoid the corporate-level tax that would have arisen in a
straight asset sale.27
The tax opportunities afforded by a corporate division thus provide
natural parameters for its qualification as a tax-free transaction. A cor-
porate division that simply facilitates a change in the ownership of any
portion of the original corporate enterprise ought not to be a qualifying
divisive reorganization. This conclusion is consistent with the description
of a reorganization as "a readjustment of continuing interest in property
under modified corporate forms."'28 Hence, to be tax-free, a corporate
division must constitute only a reshuffling of a corporate structure among
existing owners of that structure.29 The introduction to any significant
extent of new ownership in any of the resulting parts of the corporate
structure should disqualify the transaction from reorganization status.
In short, the function of § 355 is to identify a certain class of divisive
transactions that do not result in immediate taxation to either the share-
holders or the distributing corporation. In general, qualifying transac-
tions are reshufflings of corporate structures, driven by business
exigencies, whose ownership remains, for the most part, at a standstill for
some period surrounding the transaction.
Finally, this clarifying description of the purpose of the provision is in
harmony with the tax consequences that arise in a nonqualifying transac-
tion. As described by Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b), the reorganization result
is simply an exception from the "general rule." Therefore, a nonqualify-
ing divisive transaction is ordinarily taxable to both the shareholders and
the distributing corporation. In particular, the distributing corporation is
taxed not because there has been a disposition of assets outside of the
pre-existing corporate group, but because there has been a distribution of
stock in a transaction that does not qualify for nonrecognition treatment.
The "normal" result of this transaction is to measure the amount of gain
based on the value and basis of the stock distributed. 30 Thus, there is no
longer any conceptual problem with the measurement of corporate-level
gain resulting from the transaction.
26. Id. at 85.
27. Id. at 96.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (emphasis added).
29. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1); Schler, supra note 6, at 262; Simon & Simmons,
supra note 17, at 293-94, 298.
30. See I.R.C. §§ 311(b)(1), 336(a) (2002).
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II. IMPLEMENTING THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 355.
A. PROHIBITING OWNERSHIP CHANGE
As described in part I, a key purpose of § 355 is to make sure that
qualifying corporate divisions do not result in any significant change in
the ownership of any of the components of the corporate structure. For-
tuitously, the triggering events in existing § 355(e) are available as a gen-
eral model for implementing this purpose. That provision applies to any
corporate division "which is part of a plan ... pursuant to which one or
more persons acquire directly or indirectly stock representing a 50-per-
cent or greater interest in the distributing corporation or any controlled
corporation. ' 31 A condition like this one can be used to qualify a transac-
tion for § 355 treatment. If a divisive transaction results in a change in
interest of greater than x percent in any of the corporate components of
the transaction, then it is not a mere reorganization of continuing inter-
ests and is not entitled to tax-free treatment.
Some elaboration is necessary. First, § 355(e) turns on the existence of
a "plan" and provides a rebuttable presumption that one exists if the
change in ownership occurs during the four years immediately surround-
ing the distribution.32 Given the importance of this triggering event to
the theory of § 355, it might be preferable to provide both a flexible and
fixed period within which the change of ownership may not occur. For
example, an excessive change in interest within y years surrounding the
distribution or pursuant to a plan would cause loss of tax-free status. 33
As a technical matter, this goal could be easily accomplished by creating
an irrebuttable presumption of a plan for some appropriate period of
time.34
Some might argue that a fixed period would be too restrictive. Under
such a rule for example, an unanticipated change of ownership, such as a
hostile acquisition of one of the corporate components following a corpo-
rate division, would cause the division to be fully taxable. But qualifica-
tion for tax-free status need not turn on the good subjective intentions of
the taxpayer. A division that ends up being part of an acquisition,
whether planned or unplanned, is simply not a "mere" reshuffling of cor-
porate interests among existing owners. On the contrary, such a transac-
tion permits the taxpayer to take advantage of the tax opportunities
created by the division. Accordingly, it need not qualify for tax-free
status.
31. I.R.C. § 355(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2002).
32. I.R.C. § 355(e)(2)(B) (2002).
33. Cf BJ-'KER & EUSTICE, supra note 14, at 11-41 (suggesting possibility of fixed
holding period as condition for § 355).
34. 1 do not express any opinion regarding whether the current interpretation of a
"plan" in Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7T is appropriate. For reasons described by Mr. Schler, the
regulations may define that concept too loosely. See Schler, supra note 6, at 274. Indeed,
in certain respects, the regulations could be viewed as having unlawfully repealed the statu-
tory requirement altogether. It is evident that the legislative and Treasury staffs did not
see eye-to-eye on this provision.
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Second, the rules should make clear that changes of ownership in the
corporate components among the existing owners of the enterprise do
not disqualify the transaction. For example, the acquisition by a share-
holder of stock of a controlled corporation by reason of the shareholder's
ownership of the distributing corporation should not count as a change in
the ownership of either corporation.35
Third, trading of portfolio interests in any of the corporations involved
should not be treated as a change in ownership. The best way to imple-
ment this exception is to focus attention only on ownership changes in-
volving shareholders owning over z percent of the stock of a
corporation. 36 Moreover, for this purpose, passthrough entities should
probably be looked through. Thus, a transfer of shares by a partnership,
even though owning more than z percent, would generally be disre-
garded; the focus instead would be on the amount of stock owned by, and
changes in interest of, the partners of the partnership. 37
Finally, certain transactions involving a corporate component of the di-
visive transaction, such as a complete liquidation, should be treated as a
change of ownership of that component. In that case, the division would
not simply be a "readjustment of continuing interest in property under
modified corporate forms."'38 Thus, transactions like the one in Gregory
v. Helvering39 would clearly fall outside of a qualifying, tax-free divisive
reorganization.
B. SIMPLIFICATION FACILITATED BY OWNERSHIP CHANGE CONDITION
With this single condition prohibiting certain changes of ownership in
the distributing and controlled corporations, several other requirements
of current § 355 could be repealed or greatly simplified. Most obviously,
continuity of interest would no longer be necessary. The rule against
changes of ownership would essentially codify the continuity of interest
requirement in this context.40
This codification might seem to be inconsistent with recent regulatory
amendments liberalizing the meaning of continuity of interest in the ac-
quisitive reorganization area. As a result of those amendments, disposi-
tions of acquiring corporation stock not involving that corporation are
35. Cf I.R.C. § 355(e)(3)(A) (2002).
36. See Simon & Simmons, supra note 17, at 297. Certain asset acquisitions, however,
even if involving only public corporations, would constitute ownership changes. Cf I.R.C.
§ 355(e)(3)(B) (2002). More generally, the actions of shareholders acting in concert who
collectively own over z percent of the stock should not be disregarded even though no
single shareholder owns as much as that amount.
37. Some other, more practical rule would need to be adopted to look through widely
held passthrough entities, such as mutual funds. Cf Schler, supra note 6, at 256.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (emphasis added).
39. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1). This conclusion appears to be consistent with the
role envisioned by Congress for § 355(e). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 529-30
(1997); Rev. Rul. 98-27, 1998-1 C.B. 1159; cf PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1081-82 (3d ed. 1999).
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disregarded in determining whether continuity of interest is satisfied. 41
In contrast, as just described, dispositions of distributing or controlled
corporation stock during a period surrounding a corporate division would
be extremely important in determining the tax-free status of the division.
The discrepancy illustrates the limits to the analogy between acquisitive
and divisive reorganizations. Although the same term is used, "con-
tinuity of interest" has never meant the same thing in those two con-
texts,42 and the requirement serves different purposes. In an acquisitive
reorganization, a former target shareholder who subsequently sells stock
of the acquiring corporation obtains no tax advantage that did not exist
prior to the reorganization. The same tax results-a potential capital
gains tax to the shareholder and the absence of any corporate-level tax-
could have been obtained through a sale of the target corporation stock
prior to the reorganization. In contrast, as we have seen, a disposition of
distributing or controlled corporation stock in connection with a divisive
reorganization can result in tax advantages at both the shareholder and
corporate levels. It is appropriate, therefore, to monitor closely disposi-
tions in the latter case but not the former.43
It should also be possible to repeal most or all of the "device" clause.
In general, that clause attempts to prevent bailouts through sales of dis-
tributing or controlled corporation stock subsequent to the division. 44
But under the proposed change of ownership rule, if such sales occur
within the prohibited period and exceed the permissible level, then tax-
free status of the corporate separation would be lost and the device
clause would not be needed.
There would be a continuing need to protect against dispositions falling
within the permissible level. For example, suppose that only 50-percent-
or-greater changes in ownership of the distributing or controlled corpora-
tions within a particular period surrounding a corporate division would
cause it to be taxable. In that case, a pro rata distribution of controlled
corporation stock followed by sales of up to 50 percent of such stock
might still be a qualifying division despite the potential tax advantage to
the selling shareholders. It is possible that one or more of the other con-
ditions for § 355 (described below) would disqualify transactions like this.
Alternatively, a straightforward way to address this problem would be to
provide that planned dispositions of any interest in the distributing or
controlled corporations would disqualify the transaction for tax-free
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i), -1(e)(6), ex. (1)(i).
42. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1)(i), with Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c)(1).
43. If continuity of interest were interpreted in the same way for divisive reorganiza-
tions as it is for acquisitive reorganizations, then the focus would presumably be on the
mixture of controlled corporation stock and boot distributed in the divisive transaction.
Because the distributing corporation ordinarily must distribute all of its controlled corpo-
ration stock in order to qualify for § 355 treatment, this narrow interpretation of continuity
of interest would significantly reduce its importance as a qualifying condition for tax-free
divisive reorganizations. Cf. David F. Shores, Reexamining Continuity of Shareholder In-
terest in Corporate Divisions, 18 VA. TAX REV. 473, 542-43 (1999).
44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(1).
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treatment.45 Although it might seem harsh that a planned disposition of
an insignificant amount of stock could cause the entire transaction to be
taxable, that result is essentially what is authorized under current law.
46
As a conceptual matter, the planned disposition would simply cause the
transaction to fall outside of a mere reshuffling of corporate interests
among existing owners. In any event, no matter how this problem is re-
solved, it would seem that much of the law pertaining to the device
clause, including the bulk of the device and non-device factors, could be
eliminated. 47
Section 355(d) could also be repealed. There is substantial overlap in
the triggering events of this subsection and those of § 355(e). Both apply
in the event of a 50-percent-or-greater change of ownership in either the
distributing or controlled corporation as part of the corporate division.48
The principal differences are: (1) § 355(d) prohibits the change of owner-
ship during the five-year period immediately prior to the distribution
whereas § 355(e) applies to ownership changes during a flexible period
(part of a "plan") surrounding the time of distribution; and (2) § 355(e)
extends to ownership changes not effected by "purchase," such as acquisi-
tive reorganizations. 49 The proposed ownership change rule should apply
to an appropriate period of time surrounding the distribution and make
§ 355(d) unnecessary.
Finally, although the ownership change rule would generally be
modeled after the triggering events of § 355(e), a remaining question is
whether the provision's extension to ownership changes not effected by
purchase should be retained. Or should revival of the Morris Trust trans-
action 50 be permitted? Section 355(e) originated as a limited effort to
eliminate some nonsensical distinctions involving divisive transactions
that had developed in the law.51 Subsequently, the role of the provision
45. Unplanned dispositions within y years of the division would continue to be dis-
qualifying only if they exceed a permissible level.
46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(2)(iii)(B) (planned disposition of stock following divi-
sion is substantial evidence of device). Violation of the device clause might be avoided
under current law if, for example, a provision like § 302(a) applied to the distributee in the
absence of § 355. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d)(5)(iv). But it is difficult to rationalize why
the form of the distribution as a spinoff or splitoff should have an impact on the corporate-
level consequences of the distribution.
47. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(d). Bear in mind that despite inclusion of the word "de-
vice" in the statute, the clause is not a general anti-avoidance rule. It is specifically di-
rected towards a particular type of tax avoidance which is not relevant to determining
whether a divisive transaction is analogous to a reorganization. Although Mr. Schler
would retain the device clause, his support seems half-hearted and he points out in several
places its inadequacies. See Schler, supra note 6, at 266, 272.
48. See I.R.C. § 355(d)(2), (d)(3), (e)(2)(A)(ii).
49. Cf I.R.C. § 355(d)(5).
50. Comm'r v. Mary Archer W. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966). "Morris
Trust transaction" refers generically to a corporate division followed by a change in owner-
ship of the distributing or controlled corporation by reason of an acquisitive reorganization
of such corporation. The specific transaction involved in Morris Trust was not reversed by
§ 355(e).
51. See William D. Alexander et al., Taxation of Corporate Reorganizations, 13 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 50-51, 55 (1998) (comments of Glen Kohl, Deputy Ass't
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was expanded to treat certain leveraged transactions as, in effect, dis-
guised changes of ownership carried out by purchase. 52 But the enacted
provision goes far beyond these purposes. It causes the distributing cor-
poration in a corporate division to recognize gain if there is a planned
acquisitive reorganization of the distributing or controlled corporation.
Mr. Schler is one of the few defenders of the enacted version of the
provision. Indeed, he has been described as one of only about six people
(in the country?) who support the legislation. 53 As he indicates in his
paper, the majority of writers on this topic (including me) have taken the
contrary view. 54 The main argument to revive Morris Trust is that be-
cause an acquisitive reorganization, by definition, satisfies continuity of
interest, a corporate division accompanied by such reorganization should
not be viewed as in violation of that requirement. In other words, as I
have asked on a prior occasion, if each step of the transaction-the divi-
sion and the acquisitive reorganization-would be tax-free if unaccompa-
nied by the other, what could possibly justify treating both steps, taken
together, as a taxable transaction? 55
But, on further reflection, my question may not be so telling after all.
As described earlier, "continuity of interest" plays a different role, and
has a different meaning, in the context of divisive and acquisitive reorga-
nizations. Satisfaction of that requirement for one purpose, therefore,
does not necessarily mean that there has been compliance with it for the
other. Just as a qualifying acquisitive reorganization may not have a divi-
sive element to it,56 so perhaps must a qualifying divisive reorganization
not have an acquisitive element to it. Moreover, it does not matter
whether the acquisitive element is carried out by reorganization or
purchase. The reason is that either type of acquisition accompanying the
corporate division enables the taxpayer to gain a tax advantage that
would not otherwise have been available. For example, if the taxpayer in
South Tulsa Pathology Laboratory, Inc. had arranged for an acquisitive
reorganization of the corporation spun off to its shareholders, and the
entire transaction was treated as tax-free, the taxpayer would have dis-
posed of one business (and not the other) without an immediate corpo-
rate-level tax. This result is ordinarily unattainable in any other way.
Most critics of § 355(e) have emphasized that the Morris Trust transac-
Sec'y for Tax Policy, Dept. of Treasury, during the time § 355(e) was proposed and en-
acted); cf Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970-1 C.B. 80, made obsolete by Rev. Rul. 98-44, 1998-2 C.B.
315; Rev. Rul. 75-406, 1975-2 C.B. 125, made obsolete by Rev. Rul. 98-27, 1998-1 C.B. 1159.
52. See Reinhold, supra note 14, at 1489-90.
53. See Alexander et al., supra note 51, at 50 (comment of Glen Kohl).
54. See Schler, supra note 6, at 272.
55. George K. Yin, Is Section 355(e) a Stalking-Horse for Mandatory Section 338?,
Letter to the Editor, 80 TAX NOTES 865 (1998).
56. See Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 605 (1938); Rev. Rul. 2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436; Calvin H. Johnson, A Full and Faithful
Marriage: The Substantially-All-the-Properties Requirement in a Corporate Reorganization,
50 TAx LAw. 319, 360 (1997).
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tion does not result in a tax-free step-up in basis. 57 What they overlook,
however, is that a tax-free transaction without a step-up in basis is also
generally a tax benefit in comparison to a result requiring the immediate
recognition of gain. Moreover, as I have explained, this benefit is not
easily obtained in other ways under current law for transfers of selective
corporate assets or businesses. Indeed, even under the American Law
Institute's elective carryover basis proposal, the tax benefit gained from a
tax-free Morris Trust transaction would not necessarily be permitted.5 8
Thus, the answer to my earlier question is this: The combination of a
tax-free division followed by a tax-free acquisition actually produces tax
benefits greater than the sum of the benefits permitted by each transac-
tion on its own. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider whether the two
steps together should also be tax-free.
The proposed revision of § 355 would go one step beyond current
§ 355(e) (and § 355(d)) by causing the shareholders as well as the distrib-
uting corporation to recognize gain if there is an impermissible change of
ownership. The practical significance of this step is probably slight be-
cause the corporate-level tax alone will deter most taxpayers from engag-
ing in a nonqualifying corporate division. Whatever its effect, the result
follows logically from the theory behind the § 355 exception, and its ab-
sence from current law has been attributed to political, rather than policy,
considerations. 59
C. OTHER CONDITIONS
This section sketches out the remaining conditions for a transaction to
qualify as a tax-free divisive reorganization. Much of Mr. Schler's analy-
sis of these issues seems exactly right and, therefore, the discussion is very
brief.
Business purpose-As under current law, a qualifying transaction
would need to have a business purpose. 60 Mr. Schler would generally
adopt the same test used in the acquisitive reorganization area with the
following specific clarifications: (1) there would need to be a corporate
business purpose as opposed to one merely affecting the shareholder's
personal situation; (2) a purpose to enhance shareholder values would
qualify as a corporate business purpose; (3) the business purpose require-
ment would rarely impede a corporate division carried out by a public
57. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm. on Selected Revenue-Raising Provi-
sions, 105th Cong., 35-36 (1997) (statement of Martin D. Ginsburg); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n,
Comms. on Corporations and Reorganizations, Report on Section 355, at 8-9 (1997); Jeff
Bell, General Utilities Repeal, Section 355(e), and the Triple Tax, 87 TAX NOTES 1385, 1397
(2000); Reinhold, supra note 14, at 1493; Scott E. Stewart, Comment, New Rules for Spi-
noffs: An Analysis of Section 355(e), 51 TAX LAw. 649, 653 (1998).
58. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 73, 97 (requiring a nonsubsidiary corporation
to transfer at least "substantially all" or a "major portion" of its assets in order to be
eligible for carryover basis election); Taxing Corporate Liquidations, supra note 7, at 659-
61.
59. See Alexander et al., supra note 51, at 52-53 (comment of Glen Kohl).
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(1).
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company; and (4) a purpose to facilitate dispositions of distributing cor-
poration or controlled corporation stock would not be a qualifying busi-
ness purpose.61 These are all sensible recommendations. I would add (if
it need be said) that a qualifying purpose would not include the savings of
federal taxes in order to reject the Eleventh Circuit's dicta on this issue in
United Parcel Service v. Commissioner.62
Active business-It would also be appropriate to retain an active busi-
ness requirement. 63 This test would tend to ensure that a qualifying
transaction involves a bona fide division of a corporate enterprise for
valid business purposes. Here again, Mr. Schler makes several good sug-
gestions including applying this test on a group-wide basis, taking into
account active businesses conducted by foreign subsidiaries, and limiting
the amount of nonbusiness assets held by the group.64 The 1987 amend-
ment to § 355(b)(2)(D) could also be repealed.
Control-Some type of control requirement also seems appropriate to
ensure that the transaction constitutes a bona fide separation of a corpo-
rate enterprise. Mr. Schler's recommendation to adopt the definition of
control in § 1504(a)(2) seems correct.65
Section 336(e)-Finally, Mr. Schler urges the promulgation of regula-
tions under § 336(e) to permit the election contemplated by that provi-
sion.66  Under that election, the distributing corporation in a
nonqualifying corporate division would not have to recognize gain upon
distribution of controlled corporation stock so long as the controlled cor-
poration is deemed to have sold and repurchased all of its assets in a
taxable transaction. Thus, corporate gain or loss would be recognized by
the controlled corporation and be accompanied by a change in its asset
basis. This is a sound recommendation.
III. CONCLUSION
As described in this paper, it is possible to achieve significant simplifi-
cation of § 355, consistent with its role of not taxing business-driven divi-
sions of corporate enterprises among existing shareholders. The key
condition of a revised § 355 would be to prohibit for a period of time an
excessive change of ownership in either the distributing or controlled cor-
poration. Additional conditions would include a valid business purpose
for the transaction, an active business test, and a control requirement, all
as modified by Mr. Schler. Existing provisions that could be repealed are
61. See Schler, supra note 6, at 282-83.
62. United Parcel Serv. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1019 (11th Cir. 2001) ("'business
purpose' does not mean a reason for a transaction that is free of tax considerations"); see
Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b); George K. Yin, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Uncertain
Dimensions, Unwise Approaches, 55 TAX L. REV. 405, 424-25 (2002).
63. I.R.C. § 355(a)(1)(C), (b).
64. See Schler, supra note 6, at 283.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 281.
[Vol. 56
TAXING CORPORATE DIVISIONS
continuity of interest, device, and § 355(d), and § 355(e) would be re-
placed by the change of ownership condition.
There remains the difficult question of how well these revisions fit into
the rest of the law. Much of the disagreement regarding the future of
§ 355 has really been a debate about the proper taxation of corporate
acquisitions. Under the stock acquisition paradigm, continuity of interest
would generally be repealed for both acquisitive and divisive reorganiza-
tions and the shareholder- and corporate-level consequences of such
transactions would be determined independent of one another.67 Under
the asset acquisition paradigm, continuity of interest would assume
heightened importance, with a sufficient change of ownership of a corpo-
ration triggering immediate taxation at both the shareholder and corpo-
rate levels.68
As noted at the outset, Mr. Schler for the most part eschews that larger
debate, and this commentary has reviewed his proposals from the same
vantage point, the ground rules laid out by him. But current law's incon-
sistencies provide treacherous footing for any reform effort. Depending
upon one's perspective, it would be fairly easy to contend that the revi-
sions described in this paper would tax divisive transactions either too
early and often, or not early and often enough. Thus, although these pro-
posals should provide a measure of improvement to the law, true reform
of § 355 must await the resolution of more fundamental issues.
67. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, at 32-43; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 98TH
CONG., THE REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS,
S. PRT. No. 98-95, at 59, 62 (Comm. Print 1983); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., 99TH
CONG., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT OF 1985, S. PRT. No. 99-47, at 50, 52 (Comm.
Print 1985).
68. See James B. Lewis, A Proposal for a Corporate-Level Tax on Major Stock Sales,
37 TAX NOTES 1041 (1987); David J. Shakow, Wither, "C"!, 45 TAX L. REV. 177 (1990);
Yin, supra note 2.
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